Title :
A Game Analysis on Knowledge Spillover Effect - A Case Study of the Enterprises in the Industry Cluster
Author :
Changqi, Tao ; Shijia, Han
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Inf. Technol., Jiangxi Univ. of Finance & Econ., Nanchang, China
Abstract :
Knowledge spillover among the enterprises of a cluster is a profit game. In this paper, the author studies the process of knowledge spillover from the following three aspects: (1) Non-cooperative game: (2) Trust Game in the cooperation; (3)Infinitely repeated games based on complete information. Three conclusions can be obtained from the research: (1) If the game of knowledge spillover occurs for only one time in the short run, the two participants of the game will get into the Prisoner´s Dilemma. And there will be no knowledge spillover. (2)The participant who makes knowledge spillover initiatively will be considered to have good sincerity of cooperation in the Trust Game of knowledge spillover, which will lower the minimum standards on expected earnings of the two sides. And it will be in favor of the occurrence of knowledge spillover. (3)If the discount factor in the infinitely repeated games is large enough, the Pareto-optimal strategy combination (spillover, spillover) can be achieved.
Keywords :
Pareto optimisation; game theory; industrial economics; innovation management; knowledge management; game analysis; infinitely repeated game; knowledge spillover effect; noncooperative game; pareto-optimal strategy combination; profit game; trust game; Biological system modeling; Economics; Games; Industries; Nash equilibrium; Technological innovation; effect; game; industry cluster; knowledge spillover;
Conference_Titel :
E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3997-3
DOI :
10.1109/ICEE.2010.436