DocumentCode
2424835
Title
A Game Analysis on Knowledge Spillover Effect - A Case Study of the Enterprises in the Industry Cluster
Author
Changqi, Tao ; Shijia, Han
Author_Institution
Sch. of Inf. Technol., Jiangxi Univ. of Finance & Econ., Nanchang, China
fYear
2010
fDate
7-9 May 2010
Firstpage
1723
Lastpage
1726
Abstract
Knowledge spillover among the enterprises of a cluster is a profit game. In this paper, the author studies the process of knowledge spillover from the following three aspects: (1) Non-cooperative game: (2) Trust Game in the cooperation; (3)Infinitely repeated games based on complete information. Three conclusions can be obtained from the research: (1) If the game of knowledge spillover occurs for only one time in the short run, the two participants of the game will get into the Prisoner´s Dilemma. And there will be no knowledge spillover. (2)The participant who makes knowledge spillover initiatively will be considered to have good sincerity of cooperation in the Trust Game of knowledge spillover, which will lower the minimum standards on expected earnings of the two sides. And it will be in favor of the occurrence of knowledge spillover. (3)If the discount factor in the infinitely repeated games is large enough, the Pareto-optimal strategy combination (spillover, spillover) can be achieved.
Keywords
Pareto optimisation; game theory; industrial economics; innovation management; knowledge management; game analysis; infinitely repeated game; knowledge spillover effect; noncooperative game; pareto-optimal strategy combination; profit game; trust game; Biological system modeling; Economics; Games; Industries; Nash equilibrium; Technological innovation; effect; game; industry cluster; knowledge spillover;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3997-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICEE.2010.436
Filename
5592094
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