Auction-based spectrum sharing for multiple primary and secondary users in cognitive radio networks

In a cognitive radio network (CRN), a primary (licensed) user (PU) can share its frequency spectrum by renting this spectrum to a secondary (unlicensed) user (SU). In this paper, we propose an auction-based CRN model whose novelty is considering multiple PUs along with multiple SUs. These PUs compete with each other so that they can earn more profit while the SUs pay less and earn higher payoffs. This situation is formulated as an oligopoly market. For the SUs, we adopt Hackner utility function to obtain the demands for the frequency spectrum and according to their payoff functions the best scenario in each stage of the dynamic spectrum sharing game is selected in the case in which there is a limit on PUs to supply SUs´ demands. Simulation results show that our proposed model satisfies both groups of PUs and SUs.