Notice of RetractionEarnings Quality and the Agency Costs of Controlling Shareholder

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

High quality accounting information can help mitigate the information asymmetry of the Principal-Agent problem. So, it has a great effect on the corporate governance. Using instrumental variables and panel data model, this paper analyses how the earnings quality, measured by accrual quality, affects the agency costs of controlling shareholder empirically. It reveals that earnings quality affects the agency costs of controlling shareholder significantly; companies with higher earnings quality have lower agency costs of controlling shareholder, and the agency costs decreases with the improvement of earnings quality. The results provide new evidence on the corporate governance effect of accounting information.