DocumentCode :
2433024
Title :
Game analysis of agent incentive and supervision problem
Author :
Li, Yanhua ; Li, Nan
Author_Institution :
Manage. Sch., Harbin Univ. of Commerce, Harbin, China
fYear :
2011
fDate :
8-11 Jan. 2011
Firstpage :
1007
Lastpage :
1009
Abstract :
By using game theory and making an equilibrium analysis, the effect of incentive and supervision in overcoming the shortcomings of agent is analyzed. The paper analyzed how to make incentive and supervision mechanism more effective. Taking executive stock options as an example, as a long-term equity incentive way, the paper analyzes how to make the rational principal and agent achieve Nash equilibrium of (incentive, efforts). Finally, some revelations are got to combine with actual situation of China.
Keywords :
game theory; incentive schemes; stock markets; Nash equilibrium; equilibrium analysis; game theory; incentive; supervision; Analytical models; Barium; Companies; Economics; Games; Nash equilibrium; game theory; incentive; supervision;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Management Science and Industrial Engineering (MSIE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Harbin
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-8383-9
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/MSIE.2011.5707585
Filename :
5707585
Link To Document :
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