DocumentCode
2440201
Title
Notice of Retraction
A New Frame for Manager Incentive: Experimental Economics Perspective
Author
Ruan Qingsong ; Song Zhengwei ; Li Jianghong ; Yin Zhen
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Tongji Univ., Shanghai, China
fYear
2010
fDate
7-9 May 2010
Firstpage
5035
Lastpage
5038
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
To study manager incentive problem, based on set-dependence, this paper incorporates fairness preference into utility function of manager for the first time, constructs a new analytical frame for manager pay incentive, and finds that higher wage leads to higher incentive for manager even in the absence of monitoring. Moreover, the equal fixed wage set by different subjects results in different incentive effect.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
To study manager incentive problem, based on set-dependence, this paper incorporates fairness preference into utility function of manager for the first time, constructs a new analytical frame for manager pay incentive, and finds that higher wage leads to higher incentive for manager even in the absence of monitoring. Moreover, the equal fixed wage set by different subjects results in different incentive effect.
Keywords
incentive schemes; salaries; economics perspective; manager incentive; monitoring; set-dependence; utility function; wage; Biological system modeling; Companies; Economics; Educational institutions; Games; Materials; Incentive; Manager; Pay; Self-interest;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3997-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICEE.2010.1264
Filename
5592861
Link To Document