DocumentCode :
2447158
Title :
A fingerprint comparison of different Prisoner´s Dilemma payoff matrices
Author :
Ashlock, Daniel ; Kim, Eun-Youn ; Ashlock, Wendy
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Math. & Stat., Univ. of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada
fYear :
2010
fDate :
18-21 Aug. 2010
Firstpage :
219
Lastpage :
226
Abstract :
The Iterated Prisoner´s Dilemma is a simultaneous two-player game. The actual values of payoffs take on different values in different research projects. In this study we perform an affine normalization of the payoff matrix and compare the agents that evolve when each of five different payoff matrices is used. Four of the matrices are chosen to lie near extremes of the normalized space, while the other lies in its center. The probability of cooperative behavior evolving is strongly influenced by the choice of payoff matrix. Fingerprinting of the evolved agents demonstrates a significant shift in the distribution of strategies that arise. A significant difference in pairwise competitive ability is also found between agents evolved with different payoff matrices. Placed into tournaments with agents evolved using all five payoff matrices, the players evolved with the central payoff matrix were found to have significantly better average tournament ranking. We conclude that the choice of payoff values is not a neutral choice and must be controlled for in any design of experiments.
Keywords :
behavioural sciences; cooperative systems; fingerprint identification; game theory; multi-agent systems; probability; cooperative behavior; fingerprint comparison; pairwise competitive ability; prisoner dilemma payoff matrix; two player game; Conferences; Evolutionary computation; Fingerprint recognition; Games; Linear matrix inequalities; Thin film transistors;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG), 2010 IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Dublin
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6295-7
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6296-4
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ITW.2010.5593352
Filename :
5593352
Link To Document :
بازگشت