DocumentCode
2451935
Title
Nash Equilibria of 2-Player Finite Simultaneous Move Games
Author
Chen, Qianqin ; Ou, Ruiqiu ; Yang, Jianmei
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Commerce, South China Univ. of Technol., Guangzhou, China
fYear
2009
fDate
25-26 April 2009
Firstpage
833
Lastpage
836
Abstract
By the theory of measure and linear algebra, this paper shows that the following property holds for almost all 2-player finite simultaneous games: for any Nash equilibrium, the numbers of pure strategies assigned positive probability by two players are equal. Moreover, if all the equilibria of the game are quasi-strong, the number of equilibria of the game is finite and odd.
Keywords
game theory; linear algebra; probability; Nash equilibria; linear algebra; oddness theorem; positive probability; quasistrong 2-player finite simultaneous move game; structural symmetry; Artificial intelligence; Business; Game theory; Linear algebra; Nash equilibrium; 2-player finite simultaneous move games; Nash equilibrium; structural symmetry; the oddness theorem;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Artificial Intelligence, 2009. JCAI '09. International Joint Conference on
Conference_Location
Hainan Island
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3615-6
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/JCAI.2009.217
Filename
5159132
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