Joint Economical and Technical Consideration of Dynamic Spectrum Sharing: A Multi-Stage Stackelberg Game Perspective

We capture both the economical and technical aspects of the dynamic spectrum sharing to improve the underutilization of the scarce but valuable radio spectrum and the service providers´ revenue. Especially, we investigate the optimal mapping between the service requester pool (SRP) and the service provider pool (SPP) in the coexistence context of multiple heterogenous cognitive radios. Both the optimal pricing schemes of the SPP for the specific shared spectrum and optimal transmission strategies of the SRP for rational spectrum requirement are designed. The issue of the coexistence spectrum sharing is formulated as the secondary network utility maximization (SNUM) problem. Using Lagrange duality decomposition technique and the Stackelberg game modeling approach, we obtain the distributed algorithms with low implementation complexity and limited iterations. The proposed PBDSS will strategically interact with each other until converge to dominating solution termed as Stackelberg equilibrium solution (SES), and the numerical results reflect the improvement of the overall performance and the spectrum utilization of our proposed spectrum sharing approach.