A safety-argument based method to predict system failure

Safety-related systems are those whose failure could result in loss of life, injury, or damage to property. The use of software and programmable electronic systems in safety-related domains, which include aerospace, commercial aviation, medicine, and nuclear power generation, is increasing. Ensuring that digital systems will operate at least as dependably as the mechanical and analog systems they replace is essential, but achieving this level of dependability in a digital system can be exceptional difficult. Analyzing safety-related failures of digital systems can yield lessons for improving development and assurance practices in order to reduce the risk of future accidents, but the same factors that complicate the safety assurance of these systems also affect failure analysis. To address this problem, this paper introduces a novel approach of failure analysis. First, we provide a method of incorporating safety case to predict the failure of safety-related systems; second, we present how the safety case of a system guides iterative improvements in system safety through failure analysis; third, we provide an engineering example for its application and a method to evaluate the acceptance rate and accuracy rate of safety argument.