A secure architecture for traffic control systems with SDLC protocols

In many implementations of intelligent traffic system (ITS), the actuated signal controller (ASC) is widely deployed to control the traffic lights and other terminals. However, inadequate research has been done on the security for the link that goes between the ASC (e.g., primary device) and many secondary devices controlled by the ASC. The communication of the link is based on the old synchronous data link control (SDLC) protocol. The goal of this work is to identify and defense the major possible attacks against the SDLC-based ASC systems. First, we identify the major threats to an ASC system, including man-in-middle attacks, data tampering, bogus commands, and possible attacks, etc. Second, we develop an architecture for the network that supports a secure ASC, including authentication, data integrity, and confidentiality. Third, within such architecture, we propose the possible solutions to address the security issues, including the encryption and decryption algorithms. Finally, we present an applicable hardware and software framework and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed solutions by simulations.