SOAR: Strategy-proof auction mechanisms for distributed cloud bandwidth reservation

Bandwidth reservation is envisioned to be a value-added feature for the cloud provider in the following years. We consider the bandwidth reservation trading between the cloud provider and tenants as an open market, and design practical mechanisms under an auction-based market model. To the best of our knowledge, we propose the first family of Strategy-pr_Qof Auction mechanisms for cloud bandwidth Reservation (SOAR). First, we present SOAR-VCG that achieves both optimal social welfare and strategy-proofness when the tenants accept partially filled demands. Then, we propose SOAR-GDY that guarantees strategy-proofness and achieves good social welfare when the tenants do not satisfy with partial bandwidth reservations. We do not only theoretically prove the properties of SOAR family of auction mechanisms, but also extensively show that they achieve good performance in terms of social welfare, bandwidth satisfaction ratio, and bandwidth utilization in the simulation.