Game Analysis of Rural Land-Use Right Transfers with Government Regulations

In China, presently rural land-use right transfers are not smoothly executed because of several reasons, such as farmers´ insufficient enthusiasm of supply, land contractors´ high risk, price distortion, agency and risk prevention mechanism and so on. However, government regulations play a key role in rural land-use right transfers. In this paper, both the government and farmers´ actions and strategies during rural land-use right transfers are analyzed in the sight of government regulations by use of the game theory with construction and analysis of a game-theoretic model of rural land-use right transfers between them. It believes that a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium will exist between the government and farmers during rural land-use right transfers and their strategies are interdependent. The government could greatly excite rural land-use right transfers, and the excitation effect depends upon support level, punishment level and probability of the government for rural land-use right transfers.