Title :
Electromagnetic information leakage for side-channel analysis of cryptographic modules
Author :
Homma, Naofumi ; Aoki, Takafumi ; Satoh, Akashi
Author_Institution :
Grad. Sch. of Inf. Sci., Tohoku Univ., Sendai, Japan
Abstract :
A new class of physical attacks against cryptographic modules, which is called the side-channel attack, is now drawing much attention. Side-channel attacks exploit information leakage from a physical implementation, such as power consumption and electro-magnetic (EM) radiation. This paper presents an overview of the recent trends in side-channel attacks, including EM analysis attacks, and related activities in the security evaluation of cryptographic modules.
Keywords :
cryptography; electromagnetic waves; cryptographic modules; electromagnetic information leakage; electromagnetic radiation; power consumption; side-channel attack analysis; Algorithm design and analysis; Correlation; Encryption; Field programmable gate arrays; Oscilloscopes; Power demand;
Conference_Titel :
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), 2010 IEEE International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Fort Lauderdale, FL
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6305-3
DOI :
10.1109/ISEMC.2010.5711254