• DocumentCode
    2490684
  • Title

    Toward software-based safety systems in space

  • Author

    Klicker, Michael ; Putzer, Henrik

  • Author_Institution
    Techcos GmbH, Munich, Germany
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    9-11 June 2011
  • Firstpage
    517
  • Lastpage
    521
  • Abstract
    Space exploration missions became increasingly complex in past decade with new emerging capabilities such as sample returns from various celestial bodies and rovers. As many engineering constraints apply to deep space missions in terms of mass, size and energy, an increasing amount of system functionalities for housekeeping or science purposes is implemented in software. The development in other industrial domains requiring high-integrity software suggests that safety-related functions (both for protecting humans from hazards as well as for protecting the mission) will increasingly be implemented in software. This requires the software systems to become safer and more reliable than today. The current state of the art reveals a number of problems with developing and assessing safety critical software which explains the reluctance of the space community to rely on software-based safety measures to mitigate hazards. Among others, usually lack of trustworthy evidence of software integrity in all foreseeable situations and the difficulties to integrate software in the traditional safety analysis framework are cited. Experience from other domains and recent developments in modern software development methodologies and verification techniques are analyzed for the suitability for space systems and an avionics architectural framework (see STANAG 4626) for the implementation of safety critical software is proposed. This is shown to create among other features the possibility of numerous degradation modes enhancing overall system safety and interoperability of computerized space systems. It also potentials simplifies international cooperation on a technical level by introducing a higher degree of compatibility. As software safety can not be tested or argued into a system in hindsight the development process and the especially the architecture chosen are essential to establish safety properties for the software used to implement safety functions. The core of the safety argument- - evolves around the separation of different functions and software modules from each other by minimal coupling of functions and credible enforcing separation mechanisms in the architecture combined with rigorous development methodologies for the software itself.
  • Keywords
    aerospace computing; formal verification; safety-critical software; avionics architectural framework; celestial bodies; celestial rovers; computerized space systems; engineering constraints; safety related functions; separation mechanisms; software based safety systems; software integrity; software systems; space community; space exploration missions; space missions; system interoperability; system safety; trustworthy evidence; verification techniques; Aerospace electronics; NASA; Safety; development process; hazards; safety; software; software architecture;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Recent Advances in Space Technologies (RAST), 2011 5th International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Istanbul
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-9617-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/RAST.2011.5966890
  • Filename
    5966890