DocumentCode
2493159
Title
All Your IFCException Are Belong to Us
Author
Hritcu, C. ; Greenberg, M. ; Karel, B. ; Pierce, Benjamin C. ; Morrisett, G.
fYear
2013
fDate
19-22 May 2013
Firstpage
3
Lastpage
17
Abstract
Existing designs for fine-grained, dynamic information-flow control assume that it is acceptable to terminate the entire system when an incorrect flow is detected-i.e, they give up availability for the sake of confidentiality and integrity. This is an unrealistic limitation for systems such as long-running servers. We identify public labels and delayed exceptions as crucial ingredients for making information-flow errors recoverable in a sound and usable language, and we propose two new error-handling mechanisms that make all errors recoverable. The first mechanism builds directly on these basic ingredients, using not-a-values (NaVs) and data flow to propagate errors. The second mechanism adapts the standard exception model to satisfy the extra constraints arising from information flow control, converting thrown exceptions to delayed ones at certain points. We prove that both mechanisms enjoy the fundamental soundness property of non-interference. Finally, we describe a prototype implementation of a full-scale language with NaVs and report on our experience building robust software components in this setting.
Keywords
data flow analysis; error handling; software reliability; system recovery; IFCException; NaV; data flow; delayed exceptions; error-handling mechanisms; fine-grained dynamic information flow control; full-scale language; fundamental soundness property; information flow error recovery; noninterference property; not-a-values; public labels; robust software components; standard exception model; Availability; Calculus; Context; Data structures; Security; Servers; Standards; NaVs; availability; delayed exceptions; dynamic information flow control; error recovery; exception handling; fine-grained labeling; not-a-values; programming-language design; public labels; reliability;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Security and Privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location
Berkeley, CA
ISSN
1081-6011
Print_ISBN
978-1-4673-6166-8
Electronic_ISBN
1081-6011
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/SP.2013.10
Filename
6547098
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