A model of self-adapting process of suppliers´ bidding strategies

Author

Hao, Zhigang ; Yu, Yixin ; Liu, Huaidong

Author_Institution

Dept. of Electr. Eng., Tianjin Univ., China

Volume

3

fYear

2002

fDate

2002

Firstpage

1824

Abstract

Based on some previous research, a model of suppliers´ bidding strategies is proposed in this paper. The model is developed to observe the suppliers´ self-adapting process from the view of collusion degree in power markets. The dynamic game theory of incomplete information and the theory of posterior probability are used. Based on the model, simulations of the effects of the suppliers´ marginal operating cost, the demand elasticities, the demand and the load forecast errors are provided. The results show that each supplier has a process to adapt to the power market, the collusion degree among the suppliers is also evolving during this process. We can observe some more details about market behavior and forecast the future situation in a power market by using this model.

Keywords

game theory; load forecasting; power markets; power system economics; probability; demand elasticities; dynamic game theory; incomplete information; load forecast errors; marginal operating cost; posterior probability theory; power market behavior; self-adapting process model; suppliers bidding strategies; suppliers´ collusion; suppliers´ marginal operating cost; Costs; Demand forecasting; Economic forecasting; Game theory; Load forecasting; Oligopoly; Power industry; Power markets; Power supplies; Predictive models;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Power System Technology, 2002. Proceedings. PowerCon 2002. International Conference on

Print_ISBN

0-7803-7459-2

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICPST.2002.1067846

Filename

1067846