DocumentCode :
2522757
Title :
Dynamic Spectrum Sharing in Femtocells: A Comparison of Selfish versus Altruistic Strategies
Author :
Costa, Gustavo W O ; Garcia, Luis G U ; Cattoni, Andrea F. ; Pedersen, Klaus I. ; Mogensen, Preben E.
Author_Institution :
Aalborg Univ., Aalborg, Denmark
fYear :
2011
fDate :
5-8 Sept. 2011
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
5
Abstract :
Dynamic spectrum approaches are steadily gaining momentum, especially in the context of femtocells. Yet designing efficient, stable, fair and scalable distributed algorithms is no easy feat, specially if the cells in a wireless network tend to act selfish and independently. Game Theory is a powerful toolbox which models the interaction of autonomous agents. In this paper we present a game theoretic model for a dynamic spectrum sharing framework recently proposed for femtocells. Our analysis includes cases where femtocells compete for spectrum as well as cooperative cases towards a common goal. The system level simulation results show that strict adherence to the game-theoretic selfish behavior performs poorly compared to the non-adherent rules which balance altruism and rational egoism. The main conclusion is that practical solutions should be guided but not limited by purely theoretical assumptions.
Keywords :
distributed algorithms; femtocellular radio; game theory; radio spectrum management; altruism; altruistic strategy; autonomous agents; distributed algorithms; dynamic spectrum sharing framework; femtocells; game theoretic model; game theory; game-theoretic selfish behavior; nonadherent rules; rational egoism; selfish stategy; strict adherence; system level simulation; wireless network; Femtocells; Game theory; Games; Interference; Resource management; Signal to noise ratio; Throughput;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Fall), 2011 IEEE
Conference_Location :
San Francisco, CA
ISSN :
1090-3038
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-8328-0
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/VETECF.2011.6093055
Filename :
6093055
Link To Document :
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