Games among long and short term electricity producers and users

We consider a system that consists of a major player infinite time horizon and minor players remaining in the system for overlapping and different finite time periods and with different quality features. We study how they interact among themselves (horizontal interaction), and with the major player respectively (vertical interaction), via their decisions/strategies and the impact of the length of the time interval that the minor players remain in the system. In this paper this time is various and we study how this feature influences the cost of the major player and the cost of the minor players. Our major player is the PPC (Public Power Corporation) and the minor players are the energy consumers (houses, industries etc.) or renewable energy producers (for example photovoltaic solar energy producers). We employ the basic game theoretic Nash solution. The optimal equilibrium (the decisions/strategies of the minor players and of the major player) will result in a dual target: global system minimum cost and individual best performance. Our game is dynamic, deterministic and evolves in discrete time. The equilibriums we consider satisfy the Dynamic Programming Principle and are thus "robust" in the presence of noise in the state equation.