A Queuing Analysis of Tolerating for Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks with a Proxy Network

Denial of Service is becoming a growing concern. As our systems communicate more and more with other that we know less and less, they become increasingly vulnerable to hostile intruders who may take advantage of the very protocols intended for the establishment and authentication of communication to tie up our resources and disable our servers. Since these attacks occur before parties are authenticated to each other. Proxy network based defense has recently emerged to address an open research challenge-protecting Internet service application from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Such schemes use a proxy network as a mediator for a hidden application to prevent direct attacks on the applicationpsilas physical infrastructure, while maintaining communication between users and the application. The proxy network provides a distributed front-end to disperse DoS attack traffic, thereby shielding the application. However, the basic feasibility and fundamental properties of such schemes remain unclear, posing critical challenges for their use. Resisting Denial of Service (DoS) attacks is an important open research. This work explores the use of overlay proxy networks to protect applications against DoS attacks. The analysis shows that proxy network-based DoS defense can effectively resist these attacks and protect application successfully.