A study on return policy considering the disposal cost and efficiency of the dead stock

Author

Wei Ling

Author_Institution

Manage. Sch., Harbin Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Harbin, China

fYear

2009

fDate

21-23 Oct. 2009

Firstpage

31

Lastpage

35

Abstract

Study on the pricing and order problem of a decentralized supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. In this supply chain, the manufacturer acts as the leader of the Stackelberg game and makes decisions for the whole supply chain benefits. Considering the return cost and the disposal efficiency of the dead stock, we built the model of the return policy and theoretically analyzed the application conditions. When the return policy is not applicable, we suggested using mark down money contract instead of the return policy to coordinate the supply chain. At last, we confirmed the two contracts with numerical examples.

Keywords

game theory; order processing; pricing; supply chains; Stackelberg game; dead stock; disposal cost; order problem; pricing; return policy; supply chain; Concrete; Contracts; Costs; Drugs; Manufacturing processes; Pulp manufacturing; Supply chains; Technology management; Transportation; Waste management; Markdown money; Return policy; Stackelberg game; Supply chain contracts;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2009. IE&EM '09. 16th International Conference on

Conference_Location

Beijing

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-3671-2

Electronic_ISBN

978-1-4244-3672-9

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICIEEM.2009.5344641

Filename

5344641