Study on a combined supply chain contract of return policy and quantity discount

Author

Zhang, Tiezhu ; Liu, Syanli

Author_Institution

Sch. of Economic & Manage., Harbin Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Harbin

fYear

2008

fDate

2-4 July 2008

Firstpage

785

Lastpage

789

Abstract

The pricing and order problem of a distributed supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer is studied. In this supply chain, the manufacturer acts as the leader of the Stackelberg game and makes decisions for the whole supply chainpsilas benefits. Aimed at the unequilibrium of benefit improvement between the supply chain members under single return policy, a combined contract of return policy and quantity discount is suggested, which can realize supply chain coordination and the win-win of supply chain members. Numerical examples are given to compare this combined contract with the return policy. The advantages of this combined contract in improving the whole supply chain and each memberpsilas profits are discussed.

Keywords

contracts; decision making; game theory; pricing; supply chain management; Stackelberg game; benefit improvement; combined supply chain contract; decision making; distributed supply chain; order problem; pricing problem; profits; quantity discount; return policy; Contracts; Supply chains; Stackelberg game; quantity discount; return policy; supply chain contracts;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Control and Decision Conference, 2008. CCDC 2008. Chinese

Conference_Location

Yantai, Shandong

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-1733-9

Electronic_ISBN

978-1-4244-1734-6

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/CCDC.2008.4597420

Filename

4597420