Title :
A note on Stackelberg games
Author :
Nie, Pu-yan ; Zhang, Pei-ai
Author_Institution :
Inst. of Ind. Econ., Jinan Univ., Guangzhou
Abstract :
Nash game and Stackelberg one are two basic games in game theory community. It is extremely important to further investigate them. Here we show that the leaders will benefit from the interactions in a game. The organization structure in economics is considered with game theory techniques. By game theory approaches, the Nash games and Stackelberg game (leader-follower games) are compared. In a Stackelberg game, if the leader acts as an average player in a Nash game, his/her payoff function value will be reduced. We therefore conclude that a player in a Nash game will benefit from the interactions if he/she transfers into the leader in the corresponding Stackelberg game and other players act as the followers.
Keywords :
economics; game theory; Nash game; Stackelberg Games; game theory community; payoff function; Biology; Game theory; Industrial economics; Mathematics; Minimax techniques; Nash equilibrium; Power generation economics; Stackelberg game; game theory; payoff function;
Conference_Titel :
Control and Decision Conference, 2008. CCDC 2008. Chinese
Conference_Location :
Yantai, Shandong
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-1733-9
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-1734-6
DOI :
10.1109/CCDC.2008.4597505