RAWR: A protocol for secure wireless ad hoc routing using trustworthiness and the wisdom of crowds

The telecommunications community has yet to agree upon a secure algorithm for wireless peer-to-peer routing. Current routing procedures use one of two methods: either rating the ldquotrustworthinessrdquo of a path like Pathrater, or relying on your neighbors´ opinions of a paths´ trustworthiness like Watchdog. Both methods have drawbacks that limit their widespread adoption by the community. The purpose of this research is to design an algorithm that combines both of these approaches and judge its speed and accuracy for detecting intrusions. In the algorithm, called ldquorate and watch routingrdquo or RAWR, each node rates it neighbors and then routes information based on these ratings. Neighbors push out their ratings, and nodes decide ldquotrustworthinessrdquo based on their own and several other opinions. We present the results of two test beds: the first one a Matlab-based simulation and a second one consisting of a physical test bed using Java SUNSpot machines. Both tests involved two types of attacks: single point failure such as dropping packets, and colluding attacks where several nodes work together to falsely report activity in the network. Our preliminary results indicate that the algorithm performs well when confronted with both of these attacks. However, some limitations apply. For instance, the network must be somewhat densely populated so that rerouting can occur as well as detection of foes in colluder attacks. Testing suggests a tradeoff between secure routing and energy management, as increased power allows for more dense communication neighborhoods hence more secure routing. Preliminary findings of the performance of the algorithm show that it is highly effective and we recommend it to the community.