DocumentCode
2568561
Title
A Novel QoS and Profit Oriented Dynamic Pricing and Admission Control Mechanism
Author
Zhou Wenan ; Ai Xiaoli ; Xie Bing ; Song Junde
Author_Institution
Sch. of Comput. Sci. & Technol., Beijing Univ. of Posts & Telecommun., Beijing, China
fYear
2010
fDate
23-25 Sept. 2010
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
6
Abstract
Pricing can be an effective way to improve system utilization and performance, which can help service providers maximize their profit. The future network will be heterogeneous, so new pricing mechanisms should be proposed which take the characters of the competitive heterogeneous network into consideration. To achieve this, firstly a reasonable utility model is given, which considers factors like multi-class quality of service (QoS) differentiation, competition among service providers, service substitutability as well as customers´´ behavior of pursuing high QoS but low price. And then the static game and Stackelberg game are adopted in pricing game formulation, and equilibriums are taken as the optimal prices. An utility oriented admission control algorithm is also designed. Finally a novel dynamic pricing mechanism is introduced about how the pricing and admission control interactively works. Simulations show the behaviors of the dynamic pricing mechanism and testify the reasonability.
Keywords
game theory; pricing; profitability; quality of service; radiocommunication; telecommunication congestion control; QoS; Stackelberg game; admission control mechanism; pricing game formulation; profit maximization; profit-oriented dynamic pricing; quality of service; service providers; Bandwidth; Degradation; Games; Pricing; Quality of service; WiMAX; Wireless LAN;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Wireless Communications Networking and Mobile Computing (WiCOM), 2010 6th International Conference on
Conference_Location
Chengdu
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-3708-5
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-3709-2
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/WICOM.2010.5601459
Filename
5601459
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