Title :
Game model on the information competition in the environmental system
Author :
Huai, Jianjun ; Huo, Xuexi
Author_Institution :
Coll. of Econ. & Manage., Northwest A&F Univ., Yangling, China
Abstract :
The paper presents a game model of informational competition between an activist and a listed company in the environmental system, and proposes that in an equilibrium, the listed company discloses favorable information and hides unfavorable information, whereas the activist exposes what the company hide after filtering the collected information, and the media reports what they have found after an investigation with the bias toward regulation. It supports the spirit of the actual legislation and provides insights about several formal channels for the NGO to participate in the regulation for the environmental system.
Keywords :
environmental economics; environmental legislation; game theory; government policies; NGO; environmental economics; environmental information disclosure competition; environmental system legislation; formal channel; game model; government regulation; information filtering; listed company; media report; Conference management; Ecosystems; Environmental factors; Environmental management; Government; Information filtering; Information filters; Intelligent transportation systems; Management information systems; Protection; Activist´s filter; Environmental system; Information disclosure; Media report; Regulation;
Conference_Titel :
Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 2009. SMC 2009. IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
San Antonio, TX
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2793-2
Electronic_ISBN :
1062-922X
DOI :
10.1109/ICSMC.2009.5346168
