DocumentCode :
2573493
Title :
The incentive idiosyncrasy of the comparative-performance-option and its incentive effect to managers
Author :
Liu, Guo-mai ; Tan, Yi-qun
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Eng. Manage., Fujian Univ. of Technol., Fuzhou, China
fYear :
2011
fDate :
27-29 June 2011
Firstpage :
1815
Lastpage :
1818
Abstract :
The sensitivity of the option value to stock price (delta) and the sensitivity of the option value to stock return volatility (vega) are selected as the analysis parameters of executive stock option. Delta increases with stock price rising and vega decreases with stock return volatility rising. By contrast with the traditional executive stock option, the delta of the comparative-performance-option is large and the vega of the comparative-performance-option is small. The delta of the comparative-performance-option is smaller as the scheduled time is longer. The comparative-performance-option can incentive executive to work hard and restrain executive to gamble is proved , and the limitation of the comparative-performance-option is discussed.
Keywords :
pricing; comparative-performance-option; delta; executive stock option; incentive effect; incentive executive; incentive idiosyncrasy; option value; restrain executive; stock price; stock return volatility; vega; Contracts; Corporate acquisitions; Economics; Finance; Presses; Sensitivity; executive compensation; gamble behavior; management performance; stock option incentive; the comparative-performance-option;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Computer Science and Service System (CSSS), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Nanjing
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-9762-1
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CSSS.2011.5972104
Filename :
5972104
Link To Document :
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