DocumentCode
2575447
Title
Security Analysis of the Micro Transport Protocol with a Misbehaving Receiver
Author
Adamsky, Florian ; Khayam, Syed Ali ; Jäger, Rudolf ; Rajarajan, Muttukrishnan
Author_Institution
City Univ. London, London, UK
fYear
2012
fDate
10-12 Oct. 2012
Firstpage
143
Lastpage
150
Abstract
BitTorrent is the most widely used Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocol and it comprises the largest share of traffic in Europe. To make BitTorrent more Internet Service Provider (ISP) friendly, BitTorrent Inc. invented the Micro Transport Protocol (uTP). It is based on UDP with a novel congestion control called Low Extra Delay Background Transport (LEDBAT). This protocol assumes that the receiver always gives correct feedback, since otherwise this deteriorates throughput or yields to corrupted data. We show through experimental investigation that a misbehaving uTP receiver, which is not interested in data integrity, can increase the bandwidth of the sender by up to five times. This can cause a congestion collapse and steal large share of a victim´s bandwidth. We present three attacks, which increase the bandwidth usage significantly. We have tested these attacks in a real world environment and show its severity both in terms of number of packets and total traffic generated. We also present a countermeasure for protecting against the attacks and evaluate the performance of that defence strategy.
Keywords
Internet; computer network security; data integrity; peer-to-peer computing; receivers; transport protocols; BitTorrent; ISP; Internet Service Provider; LEDBAT; P2P protocol; UDP; data integrity; low extra delay background transport; micro transport protocol; misbehaving receiver; novel congestion control; peer-to-peer protocol; security analysis; uTP receiver; Bandwidth; Delay; Peer to peer computing; Protocols; Receivers;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery (CyberC), 2012 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Sanya
Print_ISBN
978-1-4673-2624-7
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CyberC.2012.31
Filename
6384958
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