Title :
Power analysis attack on hardware implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGAs
Author :
Pei Luo ; Yunsi Fei ; Xin Fang ; Ding, A. Adam ; Leeser, Miriam ; Kaeli, David R.
Author_Institution :
Electr. & Comput. Eng. Dept., Northeastern Univ., Boston, MA, USA
Abstract :
Keccak is the hash function selected by NIST as the new SHA-3 standard. Keccak is built on Sponge construction and it provides a new MAC function called MAC-Keccak. These new algorithms have raised questions with regards to side-channel leakage and analysis attacks of MAC-Keccak. So far there exists prior work on attacks of software implementations of MAC-Keccak, but there has been no comprehensive side-channel vulnerability assessment of its hardware implementation. In this paper we describe an attack on the θ step of the first round of MAC-Keccak implemented on an FPGA. We construct several different side-channel leakage models and implement attacks based on them. Our work shows that an unmasked hardware implementation of SHA-3 is vulnerable to power-based side-channel attacks.
Keywords :
cryptography; field programmable gate arrays; message authentication; FPGA; MAC-Keccak; hardware implementation; hash function; message authentication code; power analysis attack; power-based side-channel attack; side-channel leakage model; Analytical models; Complexity theory; Correlation; Hardware; Registers; Software; Standards;
Conference_Titel :
ReConFigurable Computing and FPGAs (ReConFig), 2014 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Cancun
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4799-5943-3
DOI :
10.1109/ReConFig.2014.7032549
