DocumentCode
2587973
Title
AZALIA: an A to Z assessment of the likelihood of insider attack
Author
Bishop, Matt ; Gates, Carrie ; Frincke, Deb ; Greitzer, Frank L.
Author_Institution
Univ. of California Davis, Davis, CA, USA
fYear
2009
fDate
11-12 May 2009
Firstpage
385
Lastpage
392
Abstract
The insider threat problem is increasing, both in terms of the number of incidents and their financial impact. To date, solutions have been developed to detect specific instances of insider attacks (e.g., fraud detection) and therefore use very limited information for input. In this paper we describe an architecture for an enterprise-level solution that incorporates data from multiple sources. The unique aspects of this solution include the prioritization of resources based on the business value of the protected assets, and the use of psychological indicators and language affectation analysis to predict insider attacks. The goal of this architecture is not to detect that insider abuse has occurred, but rather to determine how to prioritize monitoring activities, giving priority to scrutinizing those whose background includes access to key combinations of assets as well as those psychological/other factors that have in the past been associated with malicious insiders.
Keywords
organisational aspects; psychology; security; business value; enterprise-level solution; financial impact; insider attack likelihood; language affectation analysis; malicious insiders; operating losses; psychological indicators; resources prioritization; Computer networks; Employment; Government; Laboratories; Mobile computing; Monitoring; Outsourcing; Protection; Psychology; Social network services;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Technologies for Homeland Security, 2009. HST '09. IEEE Conference on
Conference_Location
Boston, MA
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-4178-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/THS.2009.5168063
Filename
5168063
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