McEliece/Niederreiter PKC: Sensitivity to Fault Injection

Author

Cayrel, Pierre-Louis ; Dusart, Pierre

Author_Institution

Center for Adv. Security Res. Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

fYear

2010

fDate

21-23 May 2010

Firstpage

1

Lastpage

6

Abstract

The McEliece and Niederreiter public key cryptosystems (PKC) are presumed secure in a post quantum world because there is no efficient quantum algorithm that solves the hard problems upon which these cryptosystems are built. The present article indicates, however, a different type of vulnerability for such cryptosystems, namely fault injection. We present the injection fault in the McEliece scheme using Goppa codes and in two variants using quasi-cyclic alternant and quasi-dyadic codes, and describe the main difference of those constructions in this context.

Keywords

Goppa codes; cyclic codes; fault diagnosis; matrix algebra; public key cryptography; Goppa code; McEliece public key cryptosystem; McEliece scheme; Niederreiter public key cryptosystem; PKC; fault injection; post quantum world; quasi-dyadic matrices; quasicyclic alternant; quasidyadic code; Algorithm design and analysis; Computer crime; Context; Decoding; Error correction codes; Hardware; Public key; Public key cryptography; Security; Timing;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Future Information Technology (FutureTech), 2010 5th International Conference on

Conference_Location

Busan

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-6948-2

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/FUTURETECH.2010.5482663

Filename

5482663