Title :
Firm: A Team Economic Organization for Gaining Pareto Optimum Specific Public Goods
Author :
Cheng-ping, CHENG ; Feng-li, YUE
Author_Institution :
Wuhan Univ., Wuhan
Abstract :
The paper puts forward a new idea that firm is a team economic organization for gaining Pareto optimum specific public goods. Every production action needs both public goods and private goods. Specific public goods only can be produced by firm itself because government and social organization produce general public goods. If the production is linear non separability between privies, the output of public goods producing freely by privies is less than the Pareto optimum one. The idea is compatible to present theory, and can explain the basic theory phenomenon such as presence, line and scale of firm, etc.
Keywords :
Pareto optimisation; government; microeconomics; social sciences; Pareto optimum specific public goods; government organization; private goods; social organization; team economic organization; Conference management; Contracts; Costs; Engineering management; Government; Investments; Power generation economics; Pricing; Production; Protection; nature of firm; pareto optimum specific public goods; specific public goods; team economic organization;
Conference_Titel :
Management Science and Engineering, 2007. ICMSE 2007. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Harbin
Print_ISBN :
978-7-88358-080-5
Electronic_ISBN :
978-7-88358-080-5
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSE.2007.4421985