• DocumentCode
    2653767
  • Title

    Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Financing Constraints or Agency Conflicts? Evidence from China

  • Author

    Qi, LUO ; Li-jian, LIU

  • Author_Institution
    Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Wuhan
  • fYear
    2007
  • fDate
    20-22 Aug. 2007
  • Firstpage
    1713
  • Lastpage
    1718
  • Abstract
    Based on a sample of Chinese listed companies, this paper explores the reasons for the relationship between cash flow and investment spending though examining the role of cash holdings on the investment-cash flow sensitivity. We find that the strong cash flow sensitivities of investment spending are indeed associated with companies´ financing constraints or overinvestment of managerial discretions. The results suggest that the private enterprises and the large-sized local SOEs are more likely to over-invest, and higher levels of cash holdings play significant entrenchment effects and exacerbate the overinvestment behaviors of these companies. The results also imply that the small and medium-sized SOEs are suffered from financing constraints and their cash holdings act as a hedging device and mitigate the extent of financing constraints.
  • Keywords
    investment; organisational aspects; cash holdings; financing constraints; investment spending; investment-cash flow sensitivity; managerial discretions overinvestment; private enterprises; Companies; Conference management; Costs; Engineering management; Financial management; Investments; Profitability; Project management; Technology management; Testing; Cash flow sensitivity of investment; Cash holdings; Financing constraints; Overinvestment;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management Science and Engineering, 2007. ICMSE 2007. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Harbin
  • Print_ISBN
    978-7-88358-080-5
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-7-88358-080-5
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSE.2007.4422089
  • Filename
    4422089