The Selection Dynamic Model Considering Anticipation in Social Population Learning

The existing selection dynamic models in evolutionary game theory are still localized in the myopia hypothesis. This paper analyzes the social population have some anticipated ability, so they will consider the current payoff, the learning barriers and the payoff increasing rate, that´s the anticipative future payoff, when changing the current strategy. The paper describes the selected dynamic model considering anticipation based on the Sethi (1998), and proves that this model doesn´t accord with the weak payoff-positive dynamic. The population behavior hypothesis that they have some anticipated ability is fit for the social economy evolutionary phenomenon. At last, the paper analyzes a case that´s the Chinese rural labor transfer problem, where the existing research shows that the rural labor transfer behavior accords with the imitating behavior hypothesis, and uses the selection dynamic model considering anticipation to forecast the Chinese rural labor transferring trend until the 2050 year.