Title :
A one-shot random access game for wireless networks
Author :
Inaltekin, Hazer ; Wicker, Stephen
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Electr. Eng., Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY, USA
Abstract :
We address the fundamental question of whether or not there exist stable operating points in a network in which selfish nodes share a common channel, and consider how the system behaves asymptotically at these stable operating points as n approaches infinity. We begin with a wireless communication network in which n identical nodes (agents) contend for access on a common, wireless communication channel. We characterize this distributed multiple access problem in terms of a homogeneous one-shot random access game, and then analyze the behavior of the nodes using the tools of game theory. We completely characterize the Nash equilibria of this game for all n ≤ 2, and show that there exists a unique fully-mixed Nash equilibrium (FMNE) that is also a focal equilibrium . We show that all centrally controlled optimal solutions are a subset of this game theoretic solution. We then conclude with results about the asymptotic behavior of the nodes as n → ∞, including a bound on the rate of convergence.
Keywords :
convergence; game theory; radio access networks; telecommunication channels; convergence; fully-mixed Nash equilibrium; game theory; one-shot random access game; wireless communication channel; wireless networks; Centralized control; Game theory; H infinity control; Multiaccess communication; Nash equilibrium; Power control; Pricing; Routing; Wireless communication; Wireless networks;
Conference_Titel :
Wireless Networks, Communications and Mobile Computing, 2005 International Conference on
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-9305-8
DOI :
10.1109/WIRLES.2005.1549539