Title :
Dual-sourcing supply chain coordination
Author :
Zhou, Weigang ; Feng, Qianqian
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Math. & Comput. Sci., Xiangfan Univ., Xiangfan, China
Abstract :
This paper studies a supplier-retailer chain problem with dual-soucing channels for the retailer: ordering from the supplier and producing by himself. Customers´ demand is assumed to be linear. We And the buy-back contract can not coordinate our model. A numerical example indicates that the buy-back contract is a better strategy for both the supplier and the retailer than the wholesale price contract, and the supplier´s participation increases the retailer´s expected profit.
Keywords :
contracts; customer services; game theory; pricing; retailing; supply chain management; Stackelberg game; buy back contract; customer demand; dual sourcing supply chain coordination; supplier-retailer chain problem; wholesale price contract; Biological system modeling; Contracts; Games; Numerical models; Reliability; Supply chains; Stackelberg game component; buy-back contract; coordination; dual-soucring supply chain;
Conference_Titel :
Information and Financial Engineering (ICIFE), 2010 2nd IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Chongqing
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6927-7
DOI :
10.1109/ICIFE.2010.5609251