DocumentCode
2681772
Title
Transmission rights and generator´s strategic bidding in electricity markets
Author
Liu, Youfei ; Wu, Felix F.
Author_Institution
Dept. of Electr. & Electron. Eng., Hong Kong Univ.
fYear
0
fDate
0-0 0
Abstract
In this paper, the interaction between generator´s strategic bidding and transmission rights holding is explored. It is shown that holding transmission rights further reconfigures generator´s strategic behavior and thus influence market equilibrium. It is then demonstrated that holding transmission rights may mitigate generator´s market power in some situation (with a positive PTDF), whilst exacerbate market power in another situation (with a negative PTDF)
Keywords
electric power generation; power markets; power transmission; electricity markets; exacerbate market power; generator strategic bidding; market equilibrium; transmission rights; Distributed power generation; Electricity supply industry; Electricity supply industry deregulation; Energy consumption; Monopoly; Oligopoly; Power generation; Power industry; Power markets; Power system interconnection; Electricity markets; Financial transmission rights; Market efficiency; Strategic bidding;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 2006. IEEE
Conference_Location
Montreal, Que.
Print_ISBN
1-4244-0493-2
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/PES.2006.1709450
Filename
1709450
Link To Document