Title :
Evolving cooperation in the non-iterated prisoner’s dilemma: A social network inspired approach
Author :
Ellis, T.S. ; Yao, X.
Author_Institution :
Univ. of Birmingham, Birmingham
Abstract :
Online service provision is becoming increasingly decentralized as system designers pursue the benefits gained from utilizing nodes at the periphery of the network. However, distributing control means relying on the cooperation of participating agents, and it is a significant challenge to design mechanisms that incentivise optimal global behavior in a population of selfish, rational agents. This is particularly evident in peer-to-peer file-sharing, where a high incidence of selfish behavior in the form of downloading without uploading, leads to the network losing the benefits of a decentralized network. In this paper a notion of reputation based on simple social network analysis is used to significantly improve cooperation rates in the one-shot game of prisoner´s dilemma, where without such a technique the dominant strategy would be for all agents to defect.
Keywords :
game theory; peer-to-peer computing; control distribution; decentralized network; downloading; noniterated prisoner´s dilemma; one-shot game; online service provision; peer-to-peer file sharing; rational agents; reputation notion; selfish behavior; social network analysis;
Conference_Titel :
Evolutionary Computation, 2007. CEC 2007. IEEE Congress on
Conference_Location :
Singapore
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-1339-3
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-1340-9
DOI :
10.1109/CEC.2007.4424544