• DocumentCode
    2699219
  • Title

    k-anycast game in selfish networks

  • Author

    Weizhao Wang ; Xiang-Yang Li ; Frieder, O.

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci., Illinois Inst. of Technol., Chicago, IL
  • fYear
    2004
  • fDate
    11-13 Oct. 2004
  • Firstpage
    289
  • Lastpage
    294
  • Abstract
    Conventionally, the majority of network routing protocols assume that every network terminal or link forwards data for others without any deviation. However, this may not be true when the terminals or links are owned by individual selfish users, who always tries to maximize their own benefits instead of faithfully following a prescribed protocol. In this paper, we propose a new routing protocol, called k-anycast routing, that works well even if network links (or terminals or both) are selfish. In our protocol, the source node first finds a tree that spans k receivers out of a set of possible receivers and pay the relay links to compensate their costs. We prove that every relay link follows the routing protocol: it maximizes its profit when it declares its actual cost
  • Keywords
    game theory; routing protocols; telecommunication links; k-anycast game; network link; network routing protocol; selfish network; Costs; Intelligent networks; Internet; Libraries; Mobile ad hoc networks; Motion pictures; Peer to peer computing; Relays; Routing protocols; Unicast;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computer Communications and Networks, 2004. ICCCN 2004. Proceedings. 13th International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Chicago, IL
  • ISSN
    1095-2055
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7803-8814-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICCCN.2004.1401650
  • Filename
    1401650