DocumentCode
2699219
Title
k-anycast game in selfish networks
Author
Weizhao Wang ; Xiang-Yang Li ; Frieder, O.
Author_Institution
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Illinois Inst. of Technol., Chicago, IL
fYear
2004
fDate
11-13 Oct. 2004
Firstpage
289
Lastpage
294
Abstract
Conventionally, the majority of network routing protocols assume that every network terminal or link forwards data for others without any deviation. However, this may not be true when the terminals or links are owned by individual selfish users, who always tries to maximize their own benefits instead of faithfully following a prescribed protocol. In this paper, we propose a new routing protocol, called k-anycast routing, that works well even if network links (or terminals or both) are selfish. In our protocol, the source node first finds a tree that spans k receivers out of a set of possible receivers and pay the relay links to compensate their costs. We prove that every relay link follows the routing protocol: it maximizes its profit when it declares its actual cost
Keywords
game theory; routing protocols; telecommunication links; k-anycast game; network link; network routing protocol; selfish network; Costs; Intelligent networks; Internet; Libraries; Mobile ad hoc networks; Motion pictures; Peer to peer computing; Relays; Routing protocols; Unicast;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computer Communications and Networks, 2004. ICCCN 2004. Proceedings. 13th International Conference on
Conference_Location
Chicago, IL
ISSN
1095-2055
Print_ISBN
0-7803-8814-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICCCN.2004.1401650
Filename
1401650
Link To Document