• DocumentCode
    2740498
  • Title

    Arbitrary Copy: Bypassing Buffer-Overflow Protections

  • Author

    Piromsopa, Krerk ; Enbody, Richard J.

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., Michigan State Univ.
  • fYear
    2006
  • fDate
    7-10 May 2006
  • Firstpage
    580
  • Lastpage
    584
  • Abstract
    Recent advances in buffer-overflow protection are able to eliminate several common types of buffer-overflow attacks (e.g. stack smashing, jump table). In this paper, we introduce arbitrary copy, a type of buffer-overflow attack that is capable of bypassing most buffer-overflow solutions. By overflowing both source and destination pointers of any string copy (or similar) function, arbitrary copy is able to utilize a useful local address for attacking a system. This method can bypass even the most promising buffer-overflow protection that enforces the integrity of address such as secure bit (Piromsopa and Enbody, 2006) and MINOS (Crandal and Chong, 2004). Later, we analyze conditions necessary for the success of this attack. Though satisfying all necessary conditions for this attack should be difficult, our conclusion is that it is a potential threat and requires consideration
  • Keywords
    buffer circuits; security of data; MINOS; arbitrary copy; buffer-overflow attacks; buffer-overflow protections; computer security; destination pointers; intrusion detection; intrusion prevention; local address; secure bit; source pointers; Buffer overflow; Computer bugs; Computer science; Computer security; Computer worms; Computerized monitoring; Intrusion detection; Operating systems; Programming profession; Protection; Buffer overflow; Buffer-Overflow Attacks; Computer security; Intrusion Detection; Intrusion Prevention;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Electro/information Technology, 2006 IEEE International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    East Lansing, MI
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7803-9592-1
  • Electronic_ISBN
    0-7803-9593-X
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/EIT.2006.252213
  • Filename
    4017770