DocumentCode
2746402
Title
Strategic manipulation and regular decomposition of fuzzy preference relations
Author
Meddeb, O. ; Ben Abdelaziz, F. ; Figueira, José Rui
Author_Institution
LARODEC, Inst. Super. de Gestion, Le Bardo
fYear
2008
fDate
28-30 June 2008
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
6
Abstract
Ben Abdelaziz et al. (2008) have shown that any non-dictatorial fuzzy social choice function is vulnerable to strategic manipulation, when individuals express their preferences trough fuzzy weak relations on the set of alternatives. This paper proposes a new definition of fuzzy manipulability and dictatorship of fuzzy social choice functions. For this purpose, the decomposition of fuzzy weak relations in terms of symmetric and regular components is considered and a parallel result is provided. The proof is done by induction on the number of individuals.
Keywords
decision making; fuzzy set theory; social sciences; fuzzy preference relations; fuzzy social choice; regular decomposition; social decision making; strategic manipulation; Decision making; Fuzzy reasoning; Fuzzy sets; Power capacitors; Voting; Fuzzy sets; social decision making; strategic manipulation;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Engineering Management Conference, 2008. IEMC Europe 2008. IEEE International
Conference_Location
Estoril
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-2288-3
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-2289-0
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/IEMCE.2008.4617964
Filename
4617964
Link To Document