A Game-Theoretic Framework for Dynamic Spectrum Leasing (DSL) in Cognitive Radios

In this paper we develop a game-theoretic framework for dynamic spectrum leasing in a cognitive radio network. Dynamic Spectrum Leasing, or DSL for short, is a new paradigm for efficient spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks that was proposed recently. DSL allows the primary users to actively encourage, or discourage, secondary access depending on their instantaneous Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements and affordable power constraints. Secondary users, on the other hand, attempt to maximize throughput, or any other suitably chosen reward function, opportunistically, while not violating the interference limit set by the primary users. In this paper, we have proposed further generalization to the primary user utility function defined and a new utility function for the secondary users. We establish the conditions on the primary and secondary user utility functions so that the DSL game has desired equilibrium properties. Simulation results show the system behavior and performance at the equilibrium and also help to identify suitable system design parameters.