Title :
Strategy of Recycling Waste Resource with Governmental Incentives and Funds
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Beijing Inf. Sci. & Technol. Univ., Beijing, China
Abstract :
The collection of used products and subsequent remanufacturing has been increasingly encouraged by government incentives and funds. Assuming new products stochastic demands and end-of-products stochastic returns, a reverse supply chain recycling system led by government is established. Recycling fund from manufacturers, government subsidies and a target rebate-punish contract between government and recyclers are designed. Based on games theory and optimization theory, the optimal decisions are obtained in both decentralized and centralized conditions respectively. Finally, the performance of the proposed solution method has been demonstrated by a numerical simulation. By the economic consequences of these decisions, managerial insights and economic implications relevant to policy makers are obtained.
Keywords :
game theory; government policies; numerical analysis; optimisation; recycling; reverse logistics; supply chain management; waste recovery; economic consequence; end-of-product stochastic return; game theory; government subsidies; governmental funds; governmental incentive; numerical simulation; optimal decision; optimization theory; policy maker; product collection; product stochastic demand; reverse supply chain recycling system; target rebate-punish contract; waste resource recycling fund; Biological system modeling; Contracts; Distribution functions; Government; Recycling; Stochastic processes; Supply chains; Stackelberg games; recycling fund and subsidy; reverse supply chain; waste resource;
Conference_Titel :
Information Technology, Computer Engineering and Management Sciences (ICM), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Nanjing, Jiangsu
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4577-1419-1
DOI :
10.1109/ICM.2011.260
