• DocumentCode
    2787769
  • Title

    Analysis on the interests of construction parties in project management model based on the game theory

  • Author

    Yang, Ya-Pin ; Wang, Meng-Jun

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Civil Eng., Archit. of Central South Univ., Changsha, China
  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    17-19 June 2009
  • Firstpage
    4512
  • Lastpage
    4516
  • Abstract
    The participants in building projects have worked together in the low efficiency state for many years, which makes it difficult to maximize the interests of all participants. Game theory can explain strategy of all parties involved in the project and benefit from the situation and find the crux of the situation. Firstly, through the establishment of complete information static game model and creation of the benefit function of the project participants with the linear function, a game matrix can be constituted and the Nash equilibrium of the game model may be calculated. The Nash equilibrium of the game can express the conflict between the individual rational and the collective rational in the game of building projects. Secondly, the benefit function of the two sides of the game will be analysed and the benefit graphics of the participants can be drawn according to the benefit function. The graphics can be used to explain that the benefit of participants in the partnering model is greater than the benefit of participants in the traditional model of construction projects. So, the best strategy of two sides in game is to adopt partnering model, and all research work can provide a theoretical basis for analysis of the superiority of the partnership model.
  • Keywords
    construction industry; game theory; matrix algebra; project management; Nash equilibrium; benefit function; building projects; construction parties; game matrix; game theory; information static game model; linear function; project management model; Civil engineering; Contracts; Cost benefit analysis; Electronic mail; Game theory; Government; Graphics; Nash equilibrium; Project management; Risk analysis; Interests; Nash Equilibrium; Partnering; Project Management Model;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Control and Decision Conference, 2009. CCDC '09. Chinese
  • Conference_Location
    Guilin
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-2722-2
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-2723-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CCDC.2009.5192171
  • Filename
    5192171