• DocumentCode
    2821123
  • Title

    Attitude Adaptation in Satisficing Games

  • Author

    Nokleby, Matthew S. ; Stirling, Wynn C.

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Brigham Young Univ., Provo, UT
  • fYear
    2007
  • fDate
    1-5 April 2007
  • Firstpage
    331
  • Lastpage
    338
  • Abstract
    Satisficing game theory is an alternative to traditional game theory which offers more flexibility in modeling players in social interactions. Unfortunately, satisficing players with conflicting attitudes may implement dysfunctional behaviors, resulting in poor performance. We present a method based on evolutionary game theory by which players may adapt their attitudes to their circumstances, allowing them to overcome dysfunction. Additionally, we extend the Nash equilibrium concept to satisficing games, showing that the method presented leads the players toward equilibrium in their attitudes. These ideas are applied to the ultimatum game as a simple example
  • Keywords
    behavioural sciences; evolutionary computation; game theory; social sciences; Nash equilibrium; attitude adaptation; evolutionary game theory; satisficing game theory; social interactions; Bridges; Computational intelligence; Cost function; Decision making; Decision theory; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Pressure measurement; USA Councils;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Foundations of Computational Intelligence, 2007. FOCI 2007. IEEE Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Honolulu, HI
  • Print_ISBN
    1-4244-0703-6
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/FOCI.2007.372188
  • Filename
    4233926