DocumentCode :
2834707
Title :
Incentive pricing for optimal provisioning of service class promotion with network
Author :
Xiao-ning, Yue ; Yuan-wei, Jing
Author_Institution :
Coll. of Sci., Shenyang Univ., Shenyang, China
fYear :
2009
fDate :
17-19 June 2009
Firstpage :
4299
Lastpage :
4304
Abstract :
The dynamic pricing management strategy of network system is established in this paper. By introducing the Cobb-Douglas demand function and using the optimization theory and economic boundary theory, the scalable connection management strategy for QoS-enabled networks is studied to make the benefits of the network system and non-cooperative users maximizing and the calculation methods are presented to give the optimal provisioning and dynamic pricing of multiple service classes networks. In order to encourage and guide the non-cooperative users to select the serving request, which is stable at the optimal provisioning of the network system, the nonlinear and crossly influencing incentive pricing strategy is given by introducing the idea of game theory. The users will be amerced in economy when the demand of users deviate the expectation, this will be benefit to increase the rate of network resource using. This management strategy meets the demands of an increasing number of network users as well as a wide variety of network applications. The rationality and validity is verified by the simulator example.
Keywords :
game theory; pricing; quality of service; telecommunication congestion control; telecommunication network management; Cobb-Douglas demand function; QoS; economic boundary theory; game theory; incentive pricing; optimization theory; service class promotion; Computational complexity; Educational institutions; Electronic mail; Engineering management; Game theory; Information science; Nonlinear dynamical systems; Optimization methods; Pricing; Quality of service; Correspondence Technique; Incentive Stackelberg Strategy; Pricing; Service Level Agreement; provisioning;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Control and Decision Conference, 2009. CCDC '09. Chinese
Conference_Location :
Guilin
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2722-2
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2723-9
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CCDC.2009.5194686
Filename :
5194686
Link To Document :
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