Study on Contracts and Penalty Mechanism of Technology Alliance Cooperative Innovation Based on Evolutionary Game

In view of existing situation in our country that low efficiency and high failure rate of cooperative innovation are caused by moral hazard in technology alliance. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper studies rational firms\´ strategies selection under the penalty mechanism contained in the technology alliance\´s contracts. It is shown that, if the costs of breaking contract are less than the loss of cooperative firms, no matter what kind of income allocation, it can\´t always guarantee that the two firms continue to maintain cooperative innovation. On the contrary, if the firm obtains excess income when it adopts the cooperative strategy is more than the sum of the individual innovation income and betrayal income when it adopts "noncooperation" strategy, the firm\´s strategy selection won\´t be affect by the other firm\´s strategy selection, so cooperative innovation will be eventually maintained due to both firms follow the contract in technology alliance.