Analysis of Penalty-Sharing of Reverse Supply Chain with Risk-Averse Collector

In practice, there are two kinds of reverse supply chain. One is that the members of the reverse supply chain are dependent and strongly integrated with the forward supply chain. Another is that the members of the reverse supply chain are independent and weakly integrated with the forward supply chain, and the members make their own management decisions and take full responsibility for their own profits and losses. In the later case, especially with a risk-averse collector, the disassembly center must make some decisions to ensure enough used-products to disassemble. In this paper, we analyze the penalty-sharing of the reverse supply chain with risk-averse collector. By our study, we give the optimal penalty-sharing ratio which the disassembly center should share and the optimal quantity of the used-product which the collector should collect. Furthermore, we analyze the optimal results by a numerical example. According the analysis, we find: the penalty-sharing ratio of the disassembly center is related to the risk aversion level of the collector; the penalty-sharing ratio is an important factor which will impact the profit of the collector and the disassembly center. The disassembly center should adjust the sharing ratio of the penalty in terms of the collector´s risk-averse level.