• DocumentCode
    2852290
  • Title

    Non-competition Guarantee Value Model Research Based on Real Option

  • Author

    Zhang, Guoxing ; Chai, Guorong ; Guo, Ju-e ; Wang, Peng ; Xue, Yong

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Manage., Lanzhou Univ., Lanzhou, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    13-15 Aug. 2010
  • Firstpage
    174
  • Lastpage
    178
  • Abstract
    In infrastructure financed projects, in order to attract private investors, host governments often provide some guarantees. This paper develops a value model of non-competition guarantee with real option theory. The model is applied to infrastructure financed projects using the non-competition guarantee under derivation. The derivation results indicate that, there is incentive effect to investors when the non-competition guarantee is used by governments. Non-competition value increases with a bigger growth rate of traffic flow. And its value decreases with a bigger volatility of traffic flow.
  • Keywords
    financial management; investment; project management; government; incentive effect; infrastructure financed project; noncompetition guarantee value model; private investor; real option; traffic flow; Analytical models; Game theory; Games; Government; Investments; Lead; Mathematical model; investment threshold; non-competition guarantee; option game;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering (BIFE), 2010 Third International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Hong Kong
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7575-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/BIFE.2010.49
  • Filename
    5621754