DocumentCode
2854125
Title
Slot auction mechanism design based on budget balance
Author
Nan, Li ; Fei, Wang ; Xiaohao Xu ; Kai, Chen
Author_Institution
Air Traffic Manage. Res. Base, Civil Aviation Univ. of China, Tianjin, China
fYear
2010
fDate
26-28 May 2010
Firstpage
394
Lastpage
398
Abstract
In order to allocate airport slots efficiently and fairly, the auction theory was used to design slot auction mechanism, including allocation rules and payment rules. Firstly, aiming at the 1-1 slot trading, optimal allocation model was presented, under the guidance of allocation rules. Secondly, the payments of airlines and traffic flow management department were calculated, according to the vickrey payment rules. Thirdly, in order to meet the demand of budget balance, an improved model based on optimal allocation model was presented and several payment rules were proposed to solve this model. Finally, an example simulation was carried out. The results show that the new model can satisfy budget balance requirements. It is concluded that the optimal allocation results, pricing policy and payment rules have significant impact on the new model.
Keywords
air traffic; airports; budgeting; pricing; 1-1 slot trading; airport slot allocation; allocation rules; auction theory; budget balance requirements; optimal allocation model; pricing policy; slot auction mechanism design; traffic flow management department; vickrey payment rules; Airports; Collaboration; Compression algorithms; Decision making; Delay effects; Financial management; Pricing; Scheduling algorithm; Space technology; Traffic control; Air Traffic Management; Budget Balance; Slot Allocation; VCG Auction Mechanism;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Control and Decision Conference (CCDC), 2010 Chinese
Conference_Location
Xuzhou
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-5181-4
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-5182-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CCDC.2010.5499357
Filename
5499357
Link To Document