Incentive Provision and Job Allocation in Social Cloud Systems

Social cloud systems, which aggregate the computing capabilities of a large pool of users, have emerged in recent years as a key solution for resource provision and sharing in large-scale online communities due to their inherent flexibility and cost-effectiveness. However, the performance and reliability of these systems depend on the users´ cooperative behavior in sharing their computing capabilities. Hence, incentive mechanisms are needed to deter users from free-riding. In this paper, we first model the selfish behavior of the users supplying resources and aiming to maximize their own benefits, and compute the performance of the resulting non-cooperative equilibrium, which is highly inefficient. We then augment the existing job allocation schemes currently implemented in social cloud systems with a novel class of incentive mechanisms based on reputation-based pricing and collective punishment schemes that compel suppliers to change their selfish strategies in a manner that improves the efficiency of the system. We study the cloud system operator´s problem of jointly optimizing the incentive mechanism and the job allocation scheme in order to find an optimal social cloud protocol which eliminates the free-riding behavior of suppliers while maximizing the social welfare of the system. We rigorously prove that, using only simple designs for both the incentive mechanism and the job allocation scheme, the resulting protocol provides significant improvements in terms of the social welfare compared to existing social cloud systems.